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THE FDA MAY NOT REGULATE TOBACCO
PRODUCTS AS “DRUGS” OR AS “MEDICAL
DEVICES”
RICHARD A. MERRILL†
Professor Richard Merrill contends that the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act does not grant the FDA regulatory authority over
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. The fact that Congress did
not expressly deny the FDA regulatory authority over tobacco cannot,
Professor Merrill argues, be used to infer such authority. This
inference is particularly inappropriate in the case of tobacco
regulation, he maintains, because there is compelling evidence that
Congress had no intention of delegating this authority to the FDA. He
is unpersuaded that presidential approval legally sanctions the FDA’s
claim of authority by granting it a superficial political legitimacy.
Finally, he reminds us of the FDA’s own repeated denials of
jurisdiction over tobacco products, and he recalls the numerous times
that Congress passed legislation directed at tobacco without granting
the FDA any role in its regulation.
Professor Merrill’s Essay, like the other pieces in this volume, was
written after the United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina decided Coyne Beahm v. FDA,1 but before a three
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed that decision in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. FDA.2 In Coyne Beahm, the District Court held that the Federal
       † Daniel Caplin Professor of Law at the University of Virginia; Of Counsel, Covington
& Burling, Washington D.C. From 1975 to 1977, Mr. Merrill was Chief Counsel to the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration. He has represented The Tobacco Institute and Lorillard
Tobacco Company in the FDA's rulemaking proceeding and Lorillard in the court challenge to
the FDA's final tobacco regulations. In his Essay, Professor Merrill presents the arguments he
first advanced on March 6, 1998, at the Duke Law Journal’s 1998 Administrative Law
Conference. Here, as at the Conference, Professor Merrill offers his position as a response to
Professor Cass Sunstein’s defense of the FDA’s assertion of regulatory authority. See Cass
Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug?: Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 Duke L.J.
1013 (1998).
1. Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1393-1400 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
2. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, Nos. 97-1604, 97-1581, 97-1606, 97-1614
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authorized the FDA to regulate
tobacco products, but not tobacco advertising. The Fourth Circuit
rejected the District Court’s jurisdictional ruling and invalidated the
FDA’s regulations in their entirety. The Clinton Administration has
since requested an en banc rehearing before the Fourth Circuit.3
INTRODUCTION
In August 1996 the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
reversed its decades-old position and asserted jurisdiction over
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products4 under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA” or “the Act”).5 Contending that
these products are drug delivery devices,6 and are thus subject to
regulation as medical devices, the FDA promulgated comprehensive
regulations governing their design, manufacture, distribution, sale,
and, most notably, their advertising.7 Thus, in a single dramatic step
and without relying on any act of Congress that mentions tobacco,
the FDA transformed the personal views of Commissioner David
Kessler and President Clinton into federal law.8 A major U.S.
industry, which had not previously had dealings with the FDA, was
suddenly subject to a brand new regulatory regime.
The announced goal of the FDA’s scheme is to prevent the use
of tobacco products by persons under eighteen.9 Its principal
and 97-1605, 1998 WL 473320 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 1998).
3. See Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing, Brown & Williamson (No. 97-1604).
4. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897 (1997)) [hereinafter FDA Regulations].
5. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
6. See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are
Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional
Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 45,208 (1996) [hereinafter FDA Jurisdictional
Determination].
7. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 897 (1997).
8. See Ceci Connolly & John Mintz, 3 Unlikely Allies Built a Broad Anti-Tobacco Wave,
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1998, at A1 (detailing Kessler’s antipathy toward the tobacco industry,
and his role in convincing President Clinton of the political advantage of supporting the FDA’s
attempt to regulate tobacco products).
9. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.2, 897.14(a) (1997). The FDA estimated that “1 million
youngsters become new smokers each year.” FDA Regulations, supra note 4, at 44,573. The
FDA predicted that its regulations would help achieve the goal of reducing underage tobacco
use by one-half. See id. at 44,423. Regulations previously adopted by the Department of Health
and Human Services which provide funding incentives to states to enforce their laws against
sale to persons under eighteen should also help achieve that goal. See id. at 44,498 (citing the
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instruments are a federal ban on the sale of tobacco products to
persons under eighteen and a battery of Draconian restrictions on
tobacco advertising. Among the latter are a ban on billboards within
1000 yards of any school,10 a prohibition on the use of color or
imagery in advertisements in publications with significant youth
readership,11 various restrictions on point-of-sale displays,12 and
prohibitions of branded merchandise (e.g., T-shirts) and tobacco
brand sponsorship of concerts, exhibits, and sporting events, such as
the Winston Cup racing series.13 None of the FDA’s advertising
restrictions has become effective because a district court ruled that,
while the FDA is not barred from regulating tobacco products, the
FDCA does not give the Agency the authority to restrict their
advertising.14
Professor Sunstein defends the FDA’s legal authority to create,
by agency rule, an entirely new regulatory program for tobacco
products.15 In this Essay, I challenge his defense of the FDA’s action
and summarize the grounds for the tobacco industry’s challenge to
the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction and to the specific requirements
of its regulations. The arguments sketched here are set forth more
fully in briefs filed in the case challenging the FDA’s regulations that
is now pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.16
As would be expected, Professor Sunstein’s defense of the
FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products is erudite and
inventive. His treatment of the tobacco industry’s contrary
arguments—at least those with which he chooses to deal—is
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration [ADAMHA] Reorganization Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-391, 106 Stat. 394 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994))). However,
even former FDA Commissioner Kessler now seems unconvinced that the FDA’s regulations
will significantly affect youth smoking. See Ceci Connolly & Sandra Torry, Tobacco Bill Clears
Senate Panel; $516 Billion Measure Hikes Fees, Restricts Ads, Limits Liability, WASH. POST,
Apr. 2, 1998, at A1.
10. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b) (1997).
11. See id. at §§ 897.32(a), 897.32(a)(2).
12. See id. at §§ 897.30(a)(1), 897.30(a)(2).
13. See id. at § 897.34.
14. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1393-1400 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
15. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1998).
16. [This appeal has since been decided sub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
FDA, Nos. 97-1604, 97-1581, 97-1606, 97-1614 and 97-1605, 1998 WL 473320 (4th Cir. Aug. 14,
1998). The Clinton Administration has requested a rehearing en banc.  See Appellees’ Petition
for Rehearing, Brown & Williamson (No. 97-1604). −Eds.]
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generally fair. His conclusion that these arguments are ultimately
unconvincing is advanced with caution, for he acknowledges that a
conscientious court could legitimately rule that the FDA lacks
jurisdiction and declare the regulatory scheme it has adopted to be
unauthorized.17 Accordingly, as I said in remarks at the Duke Law
Journal’s March 6 conference, I can agree with approximately forty-
eight percent of Professor Sunstein’s analysis.
In the end, however, I do not believe that a dispassionate court,
mindful of established principles of statutory interpretation, can
accept either the FDA’s arguments or those advanced by Professor
Sunstein in support of the Agency’s position. In Part I, I focus on
gaps in Professor Sunstein’s explanation of the FDA’s position and
inconsistencies in the Agency’s explanation of its regulations. In Part
II, I highlight conflicts between its program for tobacco and the
FDCA requirements for genuine medical devices. In Part III, I show
how restricting advertising is incompatible with the FDA’s role. In
Part IV, I suggest why this audacious agency action fails even under
Chevron18 and the jurisprudence of agency deference.
I. FDA’S ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION REPUDIATES ITS
HISTORICAL POLICY AND IGNORES CONGRESS’S SCHEME FOR
CIGARETTES
Professor Sunstein’s account of the background and rationale of
the FDA’s action is incomplete in critical respects. He suggests, for
example, that the FDA’s claim to jurisdiction relies in part on
representations made by tobacco manufacturers—overtly or by
implication—about the drug-like effects of their products. This is
misleading. The true novelty of the FDA’s contention that tobacco
products are “intended to affect the structure or function of the
body,”19 and are thus within its regulatory jurisdiction, is that the
Agency does not rely upon any representations made or implied by
the makers of these products.20 Historically, as the FDA has
17. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1015.
18. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
19. FDA Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 6, at 45,205 (emphasis added). See also
id. (“[T]he Agency has determined that (1) cigarettes and smokeless tobacco ‘affect the
structure or any function of the body,’ and (2) these effects on the structure and function of the
body are ‘intended’ by the manufacturers.”) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994)).
20. See Coyne Beahm v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1389 n.14 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (“FDA does
not contend that tobacco manufacturers make any representations in connection with the sale
of tobacco products. Therefore, if intended use can be established only by manufacturer
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acknowledged, the “intended use” of an article—for purposes of the
FDCA—has been determined by the claims made for it by the seller
on the label, packaging, or in advertising.21 The FDA has not claimed
that any of the tobacco products to which its regulations would apply
bear health claims that would justify their regulation.
Instead, the FDA has contended that “intended use” may be
established by evidence that consumers overwhelmingly purchase an
article for a given use that may then be attributed to the seller.22 This
theory, that consumers’ intentions may be imputed to producers, has
never been applied by any court to any product that the FDA sought
to regulate.23 A second theory, for which the FDA has not cited even
dictum, is that the “intended use” of an article—for purposes of FDA
jurisdiction—can be shown by statements of company employees in
internal company documents.24 In sum, the FDA’s claim that tobacco
products are within its jurisdiction is based on legal theories that are
not supported by legal precedent.
It is not surprising that the FDA has attempted to give new
meaning to the FDCA’s “intended use” standard, for the Agency,
over many decades, declared that the statute did not give it
jurisdiction over ordinary tobacco products. Professor Sunstein
acknowledges this,25 but offers an incomplete history of the FDA’s
representations, tobacco products would not be subject to regulation pursuant to the FDCA.”).
21. See id. at 1390.
22. The FDA’s conclusion that tobacco products are “intended” to have drug effects is
based, inter alia, on its finding that “[c]onsumers use cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products
for pharmacological purposes, including sustaining their addiction to nicotine, mood alteration,
and weight loss.” FDA Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 6, at 44,630.
23. The FDA advanced this theory for the first time in National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v.
Mathews, 557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977), in support of its attempt to regulate vitamin supplements
containing high levels of vitamins A and D as prescription drugs, rather than as foods. See id. at
329. The court acknowledged that evidence that a product was used “almost exclusively” for
the treatment or prevention of disease might support the conclusion that it was intended for
such drug uses, but held the evidence supporting the FDA’s claim insufficient. See id. at 336. In
Action on Smoking and Health [ASH] v. Harris, 655 F. 2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980), a tobacco case,
the court upheld the FDA’s conclusion that the petitioners, who sought to require the FDA to
regulate cigarettes, had failed to assemble sufficient evidence that cigarettes were
overwhelmingly used for their drug-like effects. See id. at 240. No case has held that the FDA is
entitled to regulate a product, for which no health claims were made, as a “drug” solely on the
basis of evidence of consumer use.
24. See Coyne Beahm, 966 F. Supp. at 1391 (noting that the FDA attempted to rely upon
“internal manufacturer memoranda to establish intended use”). The District Court concluded
that internal documents, showing only the subjective intent of manufacturers, could not be used
as evidence of tobacco products’ intended use. See id. at 1392.
25. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1023-24.
MERRILL DONE FINAL.DOC 10/29/98 4:17 PM
1076 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1071
repeated denials of regulatory authority. For most of this century,
until 1994, the FDA had told anyone who would listen—including, on
several occasions, Congress—that it lacked authority to regulate
ordinary tobacco products under the FDCA.26 On two occasions the
FDA specifically rejected petitions asking that it regulate cigarettes,
first as drugs, and later as medical devices.27 This was, the Agency
said, because the sellers of those products did not make health claims
that might bring the products within the “intended use” language of
the Act.28
But FDA officials offered another reason for declining
jurisdiction. The Agency’s position was best explained by then-FDA
Commissioner Charles Edwards in congressional testimony in 1972.
This was seven years after Congress passed the first cigarette labeling
law29 and put aside legislation that would have given the FDA
jurisdiction.30 Dr. Edwards testified that if the FDA were to assert
jurisdiction over cigarettes as “drugs” it would have to ban their sale
because the FDCA does not permit the marketing of any drug whose
safety and clinical effectiveness the Agency could not affirm.31 In
26. See id. at 1381-82 (citing numerous instances of FDA denial of regulatory authority
over tobacco).
27. See Letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to John F.
Banzhaf, III, Executive Director and General Counsel, Action on Smoking and Health 4 (Dec.
5, 1977) (advising petitioner that “your request that FDA regulate cigarettes as a drug under
the Act is denied”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Letter from Mark Novitch, Deputy
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to John F. Banzhaf, III and Peter N. Georgiades, Action on
Smoking and Health 1 (Nov. 25, 1980) (writing on behalf of Jere E. Goyan, Commissioner of
Food and Drugs) (denying a request that the FDA regulate cigarettes as “devices,” citing lack
of jurisdiction) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The D.C. Circuit upheld the agency’s
determination that it lacked authority to regulate cigarettes as drugs. See ASH, 655 F. 2d at 293.
The FDA’s refusal, on jurisdictional grounds, to regulate cigarettes as medical devices was not
challenged in court. See id. at 237 n.4.
28. See Letter from Donald Kennedy, supra note 27, at 3 (“The interpretation of the Act
by FDA consistently has been that cigarettes are not a drug unless health claims are made by
the vendors.”). See also Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2248, 89th Cong. 193 (1965) [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 2248] (testimony of Winton B. Rankin, Assistant Commissioner, FDA) (“The Food
and Drug Administration has no jurisdiction under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act over
tobacco, unless it bears drug claims.”).
29. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)).
30. See H.R. 2248, 89th Cong. (1965). Congress had earlier failed to pass other legislation
that would have given the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products. See H.R. 11280, 84th Cong.
(1956); H.R. 5973, 88th Cong. (1963); S. 1682, 88th Cong. (1963).
31. See Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings Before the Commerce
Subcomm. on S. 1454, 92d Cong. 239 (1972) (statement of Charles Edwards, Comm’r, FDA).
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short, according to the Commissioner, FDA jurisdiction over
cigarettes would mean an end to their sale—a result so improbable
that the conclusion that the FDCA did not apply was inescapable.
Dr. Edwards’s observation, from which FDA officials have never
until now dissented, explains another curious feature of the Agency’s
current position, a feature that Professor Sunstein mentions but does
not explore. Indeed, his title obscures the point.32 The FDA does not
contend that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are “drugs,”
for that would mean, as Commissioner Edwards acknowledged, that
they would have to be banned. To be sure, the Agency now says,
tobacco products contain a drug, nicotine, but it quickly adds that
tobacco products are medical “devices”—articles designed and
constructed for the delivery of nicotine.33 Then, claiming that it has
discretion to regulate such “combination products” as drugs or as
medical devices, the FDA determines it will regulate tobacco
products as the latter.34 The Agency apparently believes that this
rebaptism allows it to escape the FDCA’s requirement that all drugs
be shown safe and effective. As I will explain later, this assertion is
fundamentally mistaken, if not disingenuous.
Professor Sunstein observes that the FDA has not invariably
declined to exercise jurisdiction over tobacco products, implying that
the Agency’s historical position has been one of equivocation rather
than consistent denial. Two district court rulings from the 1950s
supposedly provide evidence for this implication—the only
evidence.35 In each of the two cases the FDA sought the seizure of a
brand of cigarettes for which the seller had made overt (and
spurious) health claims in labeling and advertising.36 The government
32. The title of his article is posed as a single question: Is Tobacco a Drug? Professor
Sunstein does not address whether tobacco products are a “medical device” under 21 U.S.C. §
321(h) except to explain in a brief footnote that he “do[es] not discuss this provision, except to
suggest that if the FDA is authorized to define tobacco products as a drug, it is almost certainly
authorized to treat such products as ‘combination products’ subject to its device authority.” See
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1015, n.8.
33. See FDA Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 6, at 45,205-07.
34. See id.
35. See United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons . . . Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp.
847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959) (finding that “Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes” constituted a drug under
21 U.S.C.A. § 321(g)); United States v. 46 Cartons . . . Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 339
(D.N.J. 1953) (finding that Fairfax Cigarettes fell within the statutory meaning of “drug”).
36. See 354 Bulk Cartons, 178 F. Supp. at 848 (noting the packages were labeled “Trim
Reducing-Aid Cigarettes”); 46 Cartons, 113 F. Supp. at 337 (summarizing content of leaflets
seized with cigarettes which described a “miracle vapor” that could reduce the frequency of
respiratory diseases).
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alleged that these claims made the products “drugs” under the
FDCA, and in each case the trial court agreed.37 The manufacturers
of the cigarettes ceased making the claims and thereby escaped FDA
jurisdiction. Neither trial court ruling was appealed. The FDA did
not proceed to “regulate” the contents, labeling, or advertising of
either brand of cigarettes. Nor, more importantly, did it ever attempt
to regulate any other tobacco product.
These two cases thus reinforce the proposition that, under the
FDCA, “intended use” is proved by the seller’s claims. They do not
represent any deviation from the FDA’s repeatedly elaborated
position that the FDCA gave it no jurisdiction over ordinary tobacco
products.
Professor Sunstein repeats the FDA’s argument that the
Agency’s prior refusals to regulate tobacco products reflected
ignorance of the addictive properties of nicotine, and of the asserted
efforts of manufacturers to manipulate the level of nicotine in their
products. He argues, as does the FDA, that an agency is entitled to
change its mind about a problem if the relevant facts change.38 This
argument, plausible as a general statement of the law, simply does
not fit this case. First, if the pharmacological effects of nicotine are
enough to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products, the
Agency had jurisdiction decades ago; these were not discovered
recently. It is noteworthy that, before adopting its present
regulations, the FDA had never suggested that these effects would
make cigarettes “drugs.” Second, even the addiction claim is not new.
The citizen petition filed with the FDA by Action on Smoking and
Health, the Agency’s denial of which the D.C. Circuit upheld,
specifically alleged that nicotine was addictive.39 The FDA did not
find this allegation sufficient to alter its conclusion that it lacked
jurisdiction to regulate.40 Third, any government agency that was
paying attention had to know that cigarette manufacturers were in a
position, within limits, to influence the amount of nicotine in their
37. See 354 Bulk Cartons, 178 F. Supp. at 851; 46 Cartons, 113 F. Supp. at 339.
38. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1030. See also FDA Jurisdictional Determination, supra
note 6, at 45,238-52.
39. See Citizen Petition, FDA Dkt. No. 77P-0185, at 8 (May 26, 1977) (“[N]icotine is not
only a powerful drug; it is also a tremendously powerful addicting agent for many (perhaps the
majority) of smokers.”).
40. The FDA found the assertions made by the petitioners inadequate to justify
regulation. See Action on Smoking and Health [ASH] v. Harris, 655 F. 2d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
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products because for nearly thirty years they have been required, by
law, to report that information to the federal government.41 In short,
the suggestion that the FDA is now entitled to exercise jurisdiction,
when it could not before, because the facts have changed simply is
not plausible.42
Professor Sunstein’s account of congressional actions in this
arena—from the adoption of the FDCA in 1938, through the passage
of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in 1965, to
Congress’s enactment of legislation specifically to combat youth
smoking in 1992—is similarly incomplete. The full story is recounted
in the briefs submitted by the tobacco manufacturers in the suit
pending in the Fourth Circuit and is too long to repeat here.43
However, the reader needs to be familiar with certain highlights to
appreciate the force of the manufacturers’ claim that Congress has
effectively precluded the FDA’s regulation of tobacco products.
There is no evidence that any member of the 1938 Congress,
which passed the FDCA, believed that it could, or should, apply to
ordinary tobacco products. It had long been understood that the Pure
Food and Drug Act of 190644—the predecessor to the FDCA—did
not apply to tobacco.45 Efforts in the 1920s to enact legislation giving
41. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332, 1335-1340 (1994)).  The fact that
federal law requires information about nicotine content is evidence that the manufacturers are
able to control it, within limits, in package after package, since they obviously do not test each
package, much less each cigarette.
42. Professor Sunstein cites the belated discovery of the dangers of the pesticide DDT as
an example of his theory that new facts may give an agency authority to act that it did not
previously possess. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1031. Those dangers supplied the basis for
the Environmental Protection Agency’s ban of the pesticide in 1970 even though for years it
had gone unregulated. This example does not support Professor Sunstein’s argument. DDT had
been subject to federal regulation at least since the passage of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act in 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163 (1947) (codified at 7
U.S.C. § 136 (1994)).  For the product to be lawfully sold, it had to be registered with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, see 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1994), which surrendered responsibility for
administering the FIFRA to the EPA in 1970. In short, the USDA’s and, later, the EPA’s
regulatory jurisdiction was never in dispute. How they exercised that jurisdiction was of course
subject to change if the facts changed. In the present case, it is the existence—and not the
exercise—of jurisdiction over tobacco products that is in dispute.
43. [This appeal has since been decided sub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
FDA, Nos. 97-1604, 97-1581, 97-1606, 97-1614 and 97-1605, 1998 WL 473320 (4th Cir. Aug. 14,
1998). The Clinton Administration has requested an en banc rehearing.  See Appellees’ Petition
for Rehearing, Brown & Williamson (No. 97-1604). −Eds.]
44. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (1906).
45. The FDA’s predecessor agency took the position that the 1906 Act could not apply to
cigarettes unless they were marketed as promoting health. See BUREAU OF CHEMISTRY, U.S.
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the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco were predicated on this
understanding, and failed.46 On several occasions following the
enactment of the 1938 statute, the FDA repeated its position that it
did not have jurisdiction.47 This position was made clear during
congressional debate over what measures Congress should take in
response to the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and
Health.48 The FDA was apparently willing to be given jurisdiction,
and legislation to do precisely that was under consideration at the
same time as bills to assign regulatory responsibility elsewhere.
Ultimately, the bill that became the first Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act49 was passed and the bill to give the FDA
authority was withdrawn.50 Thereafter, when Congress periodically
revisited the question of how tobacco products should be regulated
and what federal agency should be responsible, the “FDA option”
was frequently discussed and always dismissed.51
Thus, it is fair to summarize the 1965 compromise and later
events as confirming a “deal” struck in Congress—a deal in which the
FDA was excluded from any role in federal decisionmaking about
the health effects of tobacco use. This understanding, reached in 1965
and never later altered, continued until the FDA unilaterally
repudiated it in 1996.
In the meantime, Congress had not been inactive. Between 1965
and 1992 it enacted five statutes addressed specifically to the
contents, advertising, or labeling of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products.52 In 1992, the specific concerns that later triggered the
DEP’T OF AGRIC., SERVICE AND REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENTS, 13, 21, 24 (Feb. 1914).
46. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (noting that
“in 1929, legislation which would have amended the 1906 Act to cover tobacco products was
introduced . . . but never passed” (citing S. 1468, 71st Cong. (1929))).
47. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
48. See Hearings on H.R. 2248, supra note 28, at 193.
49. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994)).
50. See H.R. 2248, 89th Cong. (1965) (introducing legislation, which was eventually
withdrawn, to place tobacco within regulatory jurisdiction of the FDA).
51. See Coyne Beahm, 966 F. Supp. at 1382 (stating that “numerous bills which would have
expressly granted the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products” had been proposed, and
noting that none of these bills passed).
52. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332, 1335-1340 (1994)) (extending public
health protection with respect to cigarette smoking); Alcohol and Drug Abuse Amendments of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-24, 97 Stat. 175, 178 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-4(b) (1994))
(requiring Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit a report every three years to
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FDA’s intervention—the belief that many young people commence
smoking before they are eighteen and the conclusion that state
enforcement of age limits has been lax—led Congress to enact
legislation to address this very problem. That legislation has two
significant features, both of which are inconsistent with the program
that the FDA has constructed. First, the 1992 Act claims only a small
role for the federal government: it provides federal funds for the
Department of Health and Human Services to distribute to states
that adopt vigorous programs to combat youth smoking.53 Second, it
leaves the authority to design and enforce such programs where it has
always rested—with the states.54 Ironically, the FDA’s substitute
program, fashioned just three years later out of statutory provisions
enacted in 193855 and 197656 that do not mention tobacco, not only
subordinates the states to the federal government but automatically
disrupts many of their efforts. This is because the medical device
provisions of the FDCA, on which the FDA relies (to escape a ban),
contain an automatic preemption of state requirements that differ
from or add to those imposed by the FDA.57
In sum, a full account of the relevant legal and administrative
history reveals that the FDA repeatedly asserted that the FDCA
gave it no authority to regulate ordinary tobacco products; that it
Congress detailing research findings regarding addictive properties of tobacco and making
recommendations for legislative and administrative action); Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1333,
1335a-1337 (1994)) (establishing a national program to increase the availability of information
on the health consequences of smoking and changing labeling requirements for cigarettes);
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30
(1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994)) (providing for public education regarding
the health consequences of using smokeless tobacco products); ADAMHA Reorganization Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 1926, 106 Stat. 323, 394-95 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26
(1994)) (conditioning each state’s receipt of federal mental health and substance abuse funds
on the state’s imposition of a minimum purchase age of eighteen for tobacco products).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26(b) (1994).
54. See id.
55. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1994 & Supp. II 1997)).
56. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (1994)) (establishing the framework for device
regulation).
57. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994). Because the FDA’s reliance on the device provisions of
the FDCA automatically displaces state requirements for tobacco products that are different
from or in addition to those the FDA has established, the agency has found it necessary to set
up a system for accepting petitions for exemption from preemption—as the law allows—and for
giving such petitions expedited treatment. See Exemptions From Federal Preemption of State
and Local Medical Device Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 808.20 (1998).
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never previously attempted to regulate such products; and that
Congress knew and approved of the FDA position. Moreover,
instead of giving the FDA the authority that all agreed it lacked,
Congress chose a very different approach—embodied in a series of
tobacco-specific laws which imposed requirements unlike those the
FDA has suddenly prescribed, and which left primary responsibility
for addressing the problem of youth smoking to the states.
The FDA obviously has concluded that the program Congress
has devised is deficient. The Agency’s response is to substitute, by
administrative fiat, a wholly new scheme while seeking to avoid
Commissioner Edwards’ prediction that regulation under the FDCA
would necessitate a ban.58 In defense of this scheme, the FDA relies
on novel interpretations of the Act that conflict with what the
Agency—and Dr. Kessler59—previously have said are the
fundamental premises of that legislation.
In his argument, Professor Sunstein deals only with the first
prong of the industry challenge to the FDA’s authority—the prong
which argues that, reading all of the relevant statutes in historical
context, Congress has precluded the FDA from regulating ordinary
tobacco products. Professor Sunstein offers the following observation
(which I have edited, I hope not unfairly, for emphasis): It is, he
wrote, “exceedingly likely . . . that the enacting Congress did not
intend to give the FDA power over tobacco.”60 This is close to a
concession that a contextual approach to interpreting the
jurisdictional language of the FDCA should lead to invalidation of
the FDA’s regulations.
II. FDA’S REGULATIONS CONFLICT WITH THE FDCA’S
REQUIREMENTS FOR GENUINE MEDICAL DEVICES
I want to address an issue with which Professor Sunstein does
not deal, but which is central to any fair assessment of the FDA’s
claim of jurisdiction over tobacco products. Broadly speaking the
issue is whether the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction and the specific
requirements of its regulations can be reconciled with the language,
structure, and history of the FDCA. My argument is not merely that
the FDA’s specific regulations should be held arbitrary or
58. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
59. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
60. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1029 (emphasis added).
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inconsistent with legal authority under section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act61—although this narrower claim is
surely implicit in what follows. Rather, my argument is that if the
FDA’s regulations conflict with the structure and language of the
FDCA, this is convincing evidence that Congress has not given the
FDA authority to regulate tobacco at all. In other words, if the
requirements of the FDCA, as written and as interpreted by the
FDA, cannot be made to fit tobacco products as the FDA describes
them, the inference is inescapable that the statute does not give the
FDA jurisdiction to regulate them.
The industry briefs in the lawsuit challenging the regulations
describe numerous collisions between what the FDA purports to
require or permit for tobacco products and what the FDCA requires
or permits for genuine medical devices. Some of the specific conflicts
are arcane, but several are straightforward and do not require
detailed familiarity with food and drug law.
A. Conflict with the FDCA’s Requirement that All Devices be “Safe
and Effective”
The most obvious conflict between what the FDCA requires and
the FDA’s scheme for tobacco is exposed by the Agency’s lengthy
indictment of the effects of tobacco use. The Agency repeatedly
characterizes cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products as unsafe.62
Furthermore, it entirely avoids addressing whether they are effective
for any health-related use. Taken at face value, these findings would
preclude the continued marketing of tobacco products if they were
“drugs”—as Commissioner Edwards testified63 and as other agency
officials have since acknowledged.64 To avoid this obviously
61. See Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) (“The
reviewing court shall – . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be – (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., FDA Regulations, supra note 4, at 44,398 (“[T]obacco use is the single
leading cause of preventable death in the United States. More than 400,000 people die each
year from tobacco-related illnesses.”). In the preamble to its proposal, the agency contended
that “tobacco products are responsible for more than 400,000 deaths each year . . . . Cigarettes
kill more Americans each year than acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), alcohol,
car accidents, murders, suicides, illegal drugs, and fires combined.” Regulations Restricting the
Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and
Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (proposed Aug. 11, 1995).
63. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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unsustainable result, the FDA contends that tobacco products may
also be regulated as medical “devices.”65 This gambit, however, does
not avoid the dilemma for, as FDA officials themselves have often
insisted, the FDCA also forbids the marketing of any device that is
not safe and effective for its intended use.66
The same year that the FDA adopted its tobacco regulations, the
Deputy Commissioner of the FDA, William Schultz, told Congress
(perhaps in a careless lapse) that: “A fundamental precept of drug
and device regulation in this country is that these products must be
proven safe and effective before they can be sold.”67 Four years
earlier, in a defense of the FDA’s action terminating the sale of
silicone breast implants, Commissioner David Kessler wrote in the
New England Journal of Medicine:
The 1976 Medical Device Amendments . . . require that medical
devices be shown by their manufacturers to be safe and effective
before they may be distributed and used . . . [T]he law requires a
positive demonstration of safety—and the burden of proof rests
squarely with the manufacturer.68
This statement was, of course, made before the FDA decided that
tobacco products were “medical devices.”
B. Conflict with the FDCA’s Prohibition of Devices Found to
be”Dangerous to Health”
The FDCA’s demand that any marketed device be safe is
confirmed by section 502(j), which prohibits the marketing of any
device that is “dangerous to health when used in the . . . manner . . .
suggested in the labeling thereof.”69 The FDA has expressly found
that “cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are dangerous products”
when used as intended.70 Congress itself so found in 1970, when, while
affirmatively permitting the continued sale of cigarettes, it required
65. See FDA Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 6, at 45,208.
66. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976 §§ 513-515, 520, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360e,
360j (1994).
67. More Information For Better Patient Care: Hearing on S. 1477 Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 83 (1996) (statement of William B.
Schultz, Deputy Comm’r for Policy, FDA) (emphasis added).
68. David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA’s Decision on Breast Implants, 326 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1713, 1713 (1992).
69. FDCA § 502(j), 21 U.S.C. § 352(j) (1994).
70. FDA Regulations, supra note 4, at 44,420.
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them to be labeled as “dangerous to your health.”71 The FDA has not
explained how the continued sale of tobacco products can be
reconciled with this statutory provision, given its own findings about
the hazards of tobacco use. Section 502(j) is clearly an impediment to
the FDA’s scheme, but apparently one the Agency considers so
inconsequential—or so awkward—that it does not even address it.
C. Conflict with the FDCA’s Exclusion of Chemical Agents from the
Category of “Devices”
Another internal conflict exposes the FDA’s willingness to
distort the FDCA so that it may exert jurisdiction over tobacco
products without having to ban their continued sale. The FDA
contends that it may regulate tobacco products as medical devices
even though they also are, or contain, “drugs” under the FDCA.72
That is, the FDA takes the position that a product may fall within
both regulatory categories. For some products this is true, but it is not
true for products that achieve their intended effects through chemical
action rather than by physical action (as, for example, a heart valve
does). The FDCA definition of “device” specifically excludes
products that achieve their intended effect through chemical action.73
Whatever may be the effects on the body of nicotine (and other
ingredients of cigarettes), they are achieved by chemical action. Such
a product—if subject to FDA regulation at all—is a drug. But this
conclusion would, obviously, imperil the FDA’s scheme.74
D. Conflict with the FDCA’s Labeling Requirements
Section 502(f)(2) of the FDCA provides that a device is
misbranded—which means it may not be sold—if it fails to bear
71. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87, 88
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994)) (requiring that cigarette packages bear
one of several approved warning labels).
72. See FDA Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 6, at 45,207-08.
73. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3) (1994).
74. The FDA attempts to reconcile its resort to the device provisions of the Act with the
statutory definition by claiming that tobacco products, as “drug delivery” systems, achieve their
intended effect by mechanical and not chemical means. Their intended effect, according to the
agency, is to get nicotine into the body. See FDA Jurisdictional Determination, supra note 6, at
45,205-18. Curiously, the FDA’s legal theory does not seem to square with its assertions about
the addictive properties of nicotine and the effects of tobacco, which, if true, would clearly be
“chemical” in nature.
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“adequate warnings against use . . . by children.”75 The statute permits
no exceptions to this requirement. The FDA’s attempt to regulate
tobacco products is premised on its conclusion that they are now, but
should not be, available to or used by persons under eighteen.76 It
would seem strange, if not outright inconsistent, for the Agency
nonetheless to conclude that the current congressionally mandated
warnings are “adequate” to protect against use by children. Yet, to
avoid the conclusion that these label warnings—which the Agency
realizes that it may not alter—do not satisfy the FDCA, the FDA has
done precisely this. Congress’s requirements for tobacco products,
which the FDA manifestly considers insufficient, are, in this single
instance, declared to be “adequate” under the FDCA.
The FDA itself once admitted that the FDCA does not “provide
authority suitable to the regulation of cigarettes.”77 The FDA’s
tobacco regulations demonstrate the accuracy of this statement. The
Agency contends that cigarettes are dangerous; the FDCA requires
proof that any device be safe and effective. The FDA is determined
to avoid banning cigarettes; yet the FDCA forbids the marketing of
any device (or drug) that has the effects the FDA attributes to
cigarettes. The FDA must find statutory support for its Draconian
controls over tobacco advertising; but the FDCA does not authorize
the FDA to impose such restrictions on the advertising of any
device.78 The FDA rejects the regulatory scheme for tobacco products
that Congress has fashioned in other statutes, and substitutes a
scheme of its own.
III. SECTION 360J(E) DOES NOT AUTHORIZE FDA TO REGULATE
TOBACCO ADVERTISING
There is one other square conflict between what the FDA seeks
to require of sellers of tobacco products and what the FDCA allows it
75. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(2) (1994).
76. See Medical Devices: Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 21 C.F.R. §§ 897.2, 897.14(a)
(1997).
77. Letter from Mark Novitch, supra note 27, at 3. Apparently the Senate supporters of
the “global settlement” legislation sponsored by Senator John McCain have come to the same
conclusion. The version of the McCain bill that garnered very strong committee support before
the recent Easter recess would do what no statute has done before: give the FDA explicit
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. It would not, however, as the FDA has attempted to
do, shoehorn tobacco into provisions designed for medical products, but instead would add a
brand new, tobacco-specific title to the FDCA. See 11th-Hour Deal by White House, McCain
Led to FDA Tobacco Plan, FDA WEEK, Apr. 3, 1998, at 1, 10-12.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 81-91.
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to require of producers of genuine medical devices. This conflict goes
to the heart of the FDA’s regulatory program, which consists mainly
of restrictions on the advertising and promotion of tobacco
products.79 The goal of the FDA’s regulations is to blunt the supposed
appeal of tobacco products to young people by controlling how their
sellers can advertise them.80 Without their restrictions on tobacco
advertising, the FDA’s regulations are an empty shell.
The FDA’s conviction that tobacco advertising must be curtailed
provides a further explanation for its determination to regulate
tobacco products as medical devices. If tobacco products were to be
regulated as drugs under the FDCA, no one—not even the FDA—
would contend that the Agency had authority to regulate their
advertising. This is because the statute gives the FDA authority only
over advertising of prescription drugs.81 The Agency obviously has no
wish to convert tobacco products into prescription drugs. It
apparently hoped that the device provisions of the FDCA would
provide the authority that the drug provisions fail to provide. This
decision, however, cannot be explained on the ground that the device
provisions specifically authorize the kind of advertising restrictions
that the FDA seeks to impose, for they obviously do not. Sections
502(q) and 502(r) of the FDCA do allow the FDA to enforce certain
limits on the advertising of what are called “restricted” devices,82 but
the FDA’s restrictions on tobacco advertising bear no resemblance to
such limits, and the Agency does not rely on section 502(q) or section
502(r) to support them.
Instead, the FDA relies on section 520(e) of the Act, which
permits the Agency to restrict the “sale, distribution, or use” of
specific devices if necessary to provide assurance that they will be
safe and effective in use.83 This provision is the counterpart to the
section of the Act that allows the FDA to restrict drugs to
79. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
80. See FDA Regulations, supra note 4, at 44,465 (“The purpose of the advertising
regulations is to decrease young people’s use of tobacco products by ensuring that the
restrictions on access are not undermined by the product appeal that advertising for these
products creates for young people.”); Medical Devices: Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 21
C.F.R. §§ 897.30, 897.32, 897.34 (1997) (establishing regulations governing tobacco product
advertising).
81. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1994).
82. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(q) (1994) (granting authority where false or misleading advertising
is used in promotion of restricted devices); 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) (1994) (granting authority where
requisite accompanying statements are omitted from advertising or other descriptive matter).
83. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (1994).
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prescription status.84 But section 520(e) does not—just as section
503(b) does not—give the FDA authority to impose any restrictions
on advertising. Section 520(e) does not mention “advertising” (or
“promotion” for that matter), while sections 502(q) and 502(r)—
enacted at very the same time—do.85 Nor does the legislative history
of section 520(e) contain any hint that the draftsmen believed it
would be a source of authority to regulate or limit advertising.
Confirmation that section 520(e) does not give the FDA
authority to regulate (much less virtually ban) advertising is provided
by the history of the FDA and the FDCA. The original 1938 Act gave
the FDA no authority to regulate advertising for any product within
its jurisdiction.86 This was no accident. A critical element of the
legislative compromise that allowed the passage of the 1938 Act was
the understanding that the FDA would not have authority to regulate
the advertising of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.87 Rather, that
authority was delegated to the Federal Trade Commission in the
contemporaneous Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the Federal Trade
Commission Act.88
In short, the FDA had no advertising authority whatever under
the original FDCA. Congress later modified this state of affairs on
two occasions. In 1962, it gave the FDA the aforementioned
authority to regulate advertisements for prescription drugs.89 And in
1976, as part of the Medical Device Amendments90 to the FDCA, the
FDA was given the authority to enforce the specific limits on
advertisements for restricted devices that appear in sections 502(q)
and 502(r).91
84. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1994).
85. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (1994) (permitting the FDA to limit the “sale,
distribution, or use” of restricted devices), with 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) (1994) (permitting the FDA
to limit “advertising” of certain restricted devices in certain specified situations).
86. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 10,440
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1994 & Supp. II 1997)).
87. See David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History
and its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 13-14 (1939).
88. See CHARLES JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL 145-46
(circa 1975); Cavers, supra note 87, at 13-14.
89. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1994)).
90. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976).
91. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(q) (1994) (granting authority to prohibit false or misleading
advertising for restricted devices); 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) (1994) (granting authority where required
accompanying statements are omitted from advertising or other descriptive matter).
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Notably, the Coyne Beahm court agreed with the industry that
the FDCA did not provide the Agency with the authority to control,
and in many instances prohibit, the advertising of tobacco products.92
However, it failed to draw the broader conclusion that this ruling
implies. If regulation of tobacco advertising is the essential ingredient
of an appropriate regulatory program for tobacco products—as the
FDA insists—but the FDCA does not empower the Agency to adopt
any of the advertising restrictions it has imposed, one must doubt that
the FDCA allows the FDA to regulate tobacco products at all.
IV. FDA’S ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION FAILS UNDER CHEVRON
How does all this fit into the Chevron93 framework, which
Professor Sunstein contends should govern the case?94 The tobacco
manufacturers have not sought to avoid the implications of Chevron,
but whether the case applies in this context is far from obvious.
Moreover, if the case applies at all, its teachings lead away from the
conclusion that Professor Sunstein seeks to draw.
With regard to application, it is not clear that Chevron deference
should be accorded an agency’s interpretation of its own
jurisdiction.95 Certain Justices have contended that it should,96 and
one court of appeals has adopted this view.97 The argument advanced
for according interpretations of jurisdictional provisions the same
deference as interpretations of other statutory provisions is that
issues of jurisdiction are not easily distinguished from issues of
agency authority generally. Whatever the plausibility of this
argument in other contexts, it does not fit this case. The tobacco
industry challenge to the FDA’s regulations raises an unambiguous
92. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1399 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (“[T]he
court finds that Congress’s delegation to the FDA of limited authority to restrict the advertising
of devices elsewhere in the FDCA suggests that § 360j(e) should not be construed so as to allow
the FDA to restrict advertising and promotion.”).
93. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
94. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1055-62 .
95. Professor Sunstein concedes that this is an unsettled question.  See Sunstein, supra note
15, at 1063 (“[P]erhaps an agency does not have, under Chevron, the power to determine its
own jurisdiction.  As a matter of first principles, it is unclear whether Chevron deference should
be due to an agency involved in a jurisdictional determination.”).
96. See Dole v. United States, 494 U.S. 26, 53-54 (1990) (White, J., dissenting); Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 380-83 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. The D.C. Circuit adopted this view in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 28 F.3d
1281, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The
Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 242-43 (1996).
MERRILL DONE FINAL.DOC 10/29/98 4:17 PM
1090 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47:1071
issue of jurisdiction. The FDA is attempting to impose a brand new
regulatory regime—encompassing product composition, labeling,
manufacture, and sale, as well as advertising—on an industry that has
never before been subject to its control. By contrast, in Chevron itself
the Supreme Court faced a question of how—and not whether—the
Clean Air Act applied to certain sources of air emissions.98 The
EPA’s conclusion that within-plant modifications should not be
regulated under the provisions of the Act applicable to new sources
did not mean that such plants fell outside the Act’s jurisdiction.99
Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court were to rule—as it has
not done yet—that deference should be given to an agency’s
interpretation of its own jurisdiction, a strong argument can be made
that problematic assertions of jurisdiction should be more closely
scrutinized than decisions that jurisdiction is lacking. This point is
particularly salient in the present context, where the FDA’s sudden
assertion of jurisdiction occurs after several decades of denial and
against a background of careful congressional attention to the
boundaries of federal authority over tobacco.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Professor Sunstein
acknowledges that the application of Chevron here is subject to
doubt. In an important earlier article, he wrote:
Does an agency have the authority to decide on its own jurisdiction?
Chevron does not say. At least if the distinction between
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional determinations could be easily
and sharply drawn, it would be tempting to say that Chevron is
inapplicable to the former. If, for example, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) is deciding whether it has
the power to regulate cable television, or the NLRB whether it can
regulate independent contractors, one might think that the rule of
deference ought not to apply. In Anglo-American law, those limited
by law are generally not empowered to decide on the meaning of the
limitation.100
98. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-42.
99. The Court’s conclusion that in-plant modifications did not require “new source”
review, see id. at 866,  might have meant that responsibility for regulating any emissions would
be vested, in the first instance at least, with the states under EPA-approved implementation
plans.
100. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2097 (1990) (citations omitted).
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Continuing, Professor Sunstein stated:
Because congressional instructions are crucial here, courts should
probably refuse to defer to agency decisions with respect to issues of
jurisdiction—again, if we assume that the distinction between
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions is easily administrable.
The principal reason is that Congress would be unlikely to want
agencies to have the authority to decide on the extent of their own
powers. To accord such power to agencies would be to allow them to
be judges in their own cause, in which they are of course susceptible
to bias.101
If a court were to follow this wise guidance, it should ignore Professor
Sunstein’s present argument and review the question of the FDA
jurisdiction over tobacco products de novo.
But let us assume, arguendo, that Chevron provides the
framework for evaluating the FDA’s claim to jurisdiction. The
district court, agreeing that Chevron did govern,102 generally followed
the FDA’s reasoning—until it came to the Agency’s claim to regulate
the advertising for tobacco products.103 However, the district court
misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s instructions and consequently
awarded the FDA more deference than the case would justify. It
assumed that the issue of FDA jurisdiction was resolved once it
found that the FDCA’s definitions were broad enough to encompass
tobacco products and confirmed that the Act did not elsewhere
expressly exclude them.104 This reasoning would justify upholding the
FDA regulation of any body-affecting product that Congress has not
expressly excluded from the Act—including, for example, firearms,105
performance-enhancing athletic wear, and exercise equipment.
The Supreme Court provided guidance to help courts avoid such
counterintuitive conclusions. In Chevron itself it instructed that, in
determining whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue raised
by an agency’s interpretation, a court should employ the traditional
tools of statutory interpretation.106  These include, of course, the text
of a statute, but they also include its structure, the context of its
101. Id. at 2099.
102. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 966 F. Supp. 1374, 1379-80 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
103. See id. at 1397-1400.
104. See id. at 1380-81.
105. Could firearms be a “device” for delivering bullets?
106. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 n.9 (1984).
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passage, its legislative history, its relationship with other relevant
laws, and the degree to which its provisions “fit” the subject matter.
The FDA’s defense of its claim to jurisdiction, like Professor
Sunstein’s reprise, subordinates or ignores these other sources of
interpretative guidance.
CONCLUSION
Professor Sunstein’s approach combines literalism with a theory
of political accountability deduced from the Supreme Court’s opinion
in the Chevron case. His argument, as I understand it, goes something
like this: The FDCA definition of “drug” is broad enough to apply to
tobacco since tobacco is not expressly excluded and the statutory
language does not limit the kinds of evidence the FDA might rely
upon to establish the “intended use” of an article. Yet the language
does not say that tobacco is covered. Thus, the argument apparently
continues, since Congress has not spoken directly to the question of
whether the FDA may regulate tobacco under the FDCA, the
Agency’s assertion that the statute may apply should be accorded
deference. Furthermore, and on this Professor Sunstein is quite
explicit, it is appropriate that the FDA be given deference because
the Agency acted with presidential approval, possibly at presidential
direction, and thus its action can claim political legitimacy.107 This
claim is stronger, apparently, than the repeated actions of Congress
which are, Professor Sunstein asserts, difficult to decipher and
premised on incomplete understandings of the effects of tobacco and
of the knowledge of those who market it.108
In the end, Professor Sunstein’s argument is a claim of legislative
authorization in only the very broadest sense. At bottom, it is a claim
that, in the absence of express congressional prohibition, an
administrative agency is entitled to extend federal authority into a
new arena and to construct an entire regulatory program for an
industry that has never before been subject to its jurisdiction. This is
a remarkable claim, one that is not supported by the Chevron case, or
any other precedent.
As I hinted at the beginning of this Essay, the reader will discern
many points on which Professor Sunstein and I agree. His account of
the history of the FDA’s treatment of tobacco, although incomplete,
107. See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1056-57.
108. See id. at 1049.
MERRILL DONE FINAL.DOC 10/29/98  4:17 PM
1998] THE FDA MAY NOT REGULATE 1093
is generally fair. His acknowledgment that the Congress which
enacted the law on which the FDA relies did not intend to give the
Agency jurisdiction over tobacco is my conclusion too. And we also
agree that the FDA’s regulations are designed to implement the
personal convictions of Commissioner Kessler and, critically,
President Clinton. For Professor Sunstein, however, this
characterization is not merely descriptive; it is the legitimating
feature of the regulations.
Apparently the FDA agrees. In a recent article, William Schultz,
FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy and the primary architect of
the Agency’s tobacco regulations, offered the following account:
In February 1994, an agency that had not been actively involved in
the tobacco issue presented a new opportunity for tobacco
regulation. In responding to a petition by a tobacco control group,
Dr. David Kessler . . . announced that the FDA would investigate
whether nicotine in tobacco products was a drug109 that could be
regulated by the FDA. That was an historic decision because it
provided an opportunity for taking decisive action on tobacco without
requiring action by Congress.110
In the final analysis the controversy over the FDA’s tobacco
regulations is a debate about the allocation of policymaking power
within the national government. Is it for Congress to decide whether
and how the national government should deal with the health effects
of tobacco use and the access of children to tobacco products, or is
this a subject for unilateral presidential choice? Congress did not give
the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products. It did not expect the
FDA to claim that it has jurisdiction. And on the several occasions
when Congress considered its options, it made conscious decisions to
deal with the subject in other ways, through different instruments.
Acceptance of Professor Sunstein’s defense of the FDA’s
authority to regulate tobacco would transform administrative law.
The legitimacy of the American regulatory state rests on the premise
that the power to enact national policy into law belongs to Congress.
To be sure, the power to execute congressional policy, including the
power to make subordinate choices contemplated by legislative
framework, may rest with administrators. But the FDA’s assertion of
jurisdiction over tobacco and its substitution of a new regulatory
109. The reader will note the surprising omission of any reference to the term, or category,
“device.”
110. William B. Schultz, 18 PACE L. REV. 27, 28-29 (1997) (emphasis added).
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program for one that Congress has enacted specifically for tobacco
surpass the broadest limits on delegated authority ever recognized by
U.S. courts.
